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Summary 
The development of mutual and commercial health insurance, and state health insurance programs in particular, 
typically provoked much criticism from the professionals involved with them. Moreover, the efforts of the Dutch 
medical association, the NMG, to influence state proposals met with little success. As a consequence, the NMG 
developed a health fund policy of its own, the demands of which newly established funds had to meet. The policy 
was designed to minimize lay control, improve fees and introduce an income limit to protect private practice. In 
the country’s cities, collective contracts were instrumental to the enforcement of the NMG’s conditions. However, 
the goal of creating a nationwide network of NMG funds was slow to materialize, maturing only: 1) because health 
fund regulation was expected after compulsory sick pay was introduced; and 2) due to the involvement of the trade 
union movement in the establishment of health funds. When the Decree on compulsory health insurance was 
promulgated in 1941, the NMG became the biggest health care insurer in the Netherlands, but this legislation 
ignored everything it had strived for, instead introducing a centralized, bureaucratic system, which left carrier 
organizations with virtually no capacity to plan their own policies.     
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1. Introduction 
From an international perspective, the history of Dutch compulsory sickness provision 
is quite exceptional. In general, global sickness benefit laws insured both sick pay and 
medical treatment, since proper medical attention was the obvious way to restrict 
absence from work through ill health. In the Netherlands, however, legislation on sick 
pay took precedence, although the legislative process took an exceptionally long time 
to be completed. The first such bill was sent to parliament in 1904, but it took until 
1930 before the Sickness Benefit Act came into force. Compulsory health insurance1 
                                                     
 I want to thank Dr. M. Kraaijestein and Dr. K.P. Companje for their critical comments on earlier 
drafts. 
1 The Dutch `ziekenfonds’ is usually translated to mean a sickness fund. In the twentieth century the 
term was mainly applied to institutions providing health care. I have, therefore, decided to use the 
phrase health fund. The Dutch term `ziekenkas’ for providing sick pay is translated as sickness fund. 
 1
took even more time to materialize, and was only introduced in 1941 when the 
country was under German occupation. By that time, almost half of the Dutch 
population was already voluntarily insured for health care. It is also astonishing to 
note that many health funds were owned and run by doctors. 
By about 1900, doctors in several countries were concerned about the 
development of sickness funds and the intended state intervention in the area of health 
insurance. Fearing for their status as independent professionals, they stressed the 
importance of professional organization in order to achieve the establishment of 
generally accepted rules regarding health funds, with political pressure to be applied if 
necessary. A brief overview of the `battle of the clubs’ in different countries is, 
therefore, provided herein to pinpoint the specific Dutch nature thereof.2 The section 
which follows contains an historical explanation of these characteristics, and also 
provides a rough sketch of the health insurance market around the turn of the century. 
Section 4 then analyzes how the Dutch Medical Association (Nederlandse 
Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst, the NMG) both attempted to influence 
the state social insurance program and also developed a policy of its own to safeguard 
its professional interests. In doing so, the NMG laid down a set of rules to apply to 
future health funds, deciding in 1913 to establish the Maatschappijfondsen, which 
were funds it owned and controlled. These funds can be regarded as the cornerstone of 
the NMG’s policy. The NMG also argued that its policy was in the best interests of 
the people insured, as it would result in better health care and improve national 
health.3 How the NMG attempted to impose its ideas upon other interested parties - 
the state, mutual funds and commercial health funds (the so-called directiefondsen) - 
is fairly well known. However, the actual development of the second pillar of the 
NMG policy, the Maatschappijfondsen, is a much less explored field.4  The first such 
                                                     
2 J. Lane, A Social History of Medicine: Health, Healing and Disease in England, 1750-1950 
(London/New York, 2001) 79. I will use the same term for the struggle between doctors and insurance 
funds in other countries. 
3 De ziekenfondsactie van de NMG (Haarlem, 1918) 4, claimed that promoting people’s health care had 
always been its idealistic aim. K.P. Companje, “Ziekenzorg en ziekengeld gescheiden verzekeringen, 
1908-1940”, in Idem (ed.), Tussen volksverzekering en vrije mark: verzekering van zorg op het snijvlak 
van sociale verzekering en gezondheidszorg 1880-2006 (Amsterdam, 2008) 225-339, 325. 
4 T. Kappelhof in a book review in Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der 
Nederlanden (BMGN) 121 (2006) 550-552, 551-2. 
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fund was set up in 1914 and, by 1941, when compulsory health insurance was 
introduced, the NMG version had been established almost everywhere.5  
Available sources contain contradictory information on the state of affairs 
relating to health funds. Moreover, our knowledge of the quantitative development 
thereof before 1936 is poor. What is known is that in the mid 1920s the National 
Medical Inspectorate conducted an inquiry into this issue, but the processing of data 
in respect thereof proved to be time-consuming; the results were only published in 
1931. Indeed, it is only since 1936 that the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) has 
published annual figures on health funds. Nevertheless, some data from the NMG’s 
archives and other sources, along with the statistical inquiries referred to above, 
enable us to reconstruct the overall picture of the development of these funds until the 
implementation of the National Health Decree in 1941, which is the subject of Section 
6. The consequences of the Decree - measured in terms of numbers of those insured - 
was the final test for doctors’ claims that they could bring about a major improvement 
in health care without state enforcement. However, the fact that most voluntary health 
funds provided only standard medical care, but not hospital treatment, suggests that 
significant improvements were impossible without outside assistance.6  
 
2. The international perspective 
German social insurance laws, which were introduced in the 1880s, were part of the 
anti-socialist policies of Bismarck, who hoped to bind the working classes to the state 
and involved the latter in the implementation of sickness laws, which provided sick 
pay and medical provision to those in need. The relevant board was comprised of two 
thirds workers and one third employers, and the self-administered workers’ fund – the 
Hilfskasse - was also incorporated into this system. As a consequence, since their 
organizations were banned, the socialists used the sickness funds to mobilize German 
workers, with the Socialist Party intensifying its efforts to control these funds when 
the ban was lifted in 1890. For their part, the country’s doctors had initially shown 
little interest in the Bismarck scheme and had not been involved in the project at all. 
Indeed, the scheme did not seem to bring about any major changes, since the Act 
                                                     
5 Except in the big cities, where successful doctors’ funds established in the nineteenth century had 
refused to give up their independence. 
6 Maandschrift CBS 35 (1940) 893-896. In 1940, 188 health funds insuring hospital care covered only 
30% of national membership.  
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covered only nine percent of the population in 1883. Nevertheless, the medical press 
soon began to publish critical comments on the effects of the law, with the sickness 
funds being held responsible for the unhappiness of many doctors with their status, 
income and prospects of making a decent living. In reality, however, much unrest was 
caused by the exceptional increase in the size of the medical profession, with the 
number of practising doctors doubling between 1883 and 1905. At the same time, the 
number of people insured under Bismarck’s law also doubled, but still covered less 
than 20 percent of the population.7 Meanwhile, in the same period, medical costs per 
member increased from 2.1 to 4.7 Marks. The available data does not, therefore, 
confirm the doctors’ complaints that the insurance funds’ boards reduced their fees to 
an absolute minimum in order to improve sick pay. Researchers also challenge the 
view that sickness funds threatened private practice. Indeed, the opposite seems to be 
true, with compulsory insurance opening up new markets.8 However, to defend 
themselves against the growing dependency on these sickness funds, German doctors 
borrowed the instruments of their opponents by establishing a trade union 
(Hartmannbund 1900) and even calling strikes. 
In the UK, meanwhile, the friendly societies were important providers of both 
sick pay and health care, and often employed a doctor or ran their own infirmaries. 
However, since the 1880s, the relationship between these funds and the medics had 
become difficult, with the latter complaining about their fees and the arbitrariness of 
some of the former when it came to hiring and firing doctors. The result was a battle 
between the two groups. Moreover, the doctors’ suggestion of the imposition of a 
wage limit on their members was unacceptable to the friendly societies, not only 
because it implied that loyal members would be excluded, but also because it would 
introduce class divisions in membership. However, because the medics themselves 
had to recognize the need for contractual practices, the British Medical Association 
                                                     
7 H. Herold-Schmidt, “Ärztliche Interessenvertretung im Kaiserreich 1871-1914”, in R. Jütte (ed.) 
Geschichte der deutschen Ärzteschaft: organisierte Berufs- und Gesundheitspolitik im 19. and 20. 
Jahrhundert (Köln, 1997) 43-95, 83, 88; K. Veraghtert, B. Widdershoven, Twee eeuwen solidariteit: de 
Nederlandse, Belgische en Duitse ziekenfondsen tijdens de negentiende en twintigste eeuw 
(Amsterdam, 2002) 74.  
8 Herold-Schmidt, “Ärztliche Interessenvertretung”, 86-89. 
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(BMA) recommended that this should be organized by doctors.9 Accordingly, when 
the UK government announced a plan to introduce the Sickness Benefit Act of 1911, 
the BMA set out a number of demands about the legislation’s content. The majority of 
which were accepted by the state.10  However, since doctors were in the minority on 
insurance fund committees, the BMA continued its opposition to government 
proposals. Despite this, the Prime Minister at the time, David Lloyd George, persisted. 
Finally, when he increased the fees promised to them, more doctors became part of 
the state system and the BMA had to capitulate.11 The separation of medical benefits 
and sick pay was, however, an important result. Indeed, medical opinion actually had 
more influence than the NMA had expected given the relatively small number of 
medical representatives on the boards. Indeed, the 1911 Act actually promoted 
employment and strengthened doctors’ powers, while simultaneously weakening the 
position of the friendly societies. 
In the US, medical provision by mutual societies was late to develop.12 In the 
1870s, so-called lodge practices were mainly restricted to ethnic and immigrant 
fraternal organizations. However, by the 1890s, more of the bodies providing sick pay 
also began to introduce medical care. In general, medical remuneration was based on 
a capitation fee. In the early twentieth century, lodge practice became a hot topic in 
medical journals, and doctors started to discuss strategies to halt the trend. As 
elsewhere, they rejected lay control and criticized capitation fees, which were far 
below their private equivalents, declaring the lodge practice to be demoralizing for the 
profession.  
As competition kept capitation fees under pressure, medical societies asked the 
different states for tighter certification requirements, resulting in a shrinking supply. 
The professional bodies also developed policies to discourage colleagues from 
entering into lodge contracts and threatened to expel disloyal physicians and arranged 
boycotts. These medical societies even succeeded in persuading hospitals to boycott 
lodge doctors, which meant that the latter’s private patients were denied access to 
                                                     
9 D.G. Green, Working-class Patients and the Medical Establishment. Self-help in Britain from the mid-
nineteenth century to 1948 (Aldershot, 1985) 55. 
10 R. Lubove, The Struggle for Social Security1900-1935 (Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1968²) 70. 
11 Green, Working-class patients, 112-114. 
12 D.T. Beito, From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State: Fraternal Societies and Social Services, 1890-
1967 (Chaphill & London, 2000) ch. 6, 109-129. 
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these facilities. Meanwhile, the judiciary sanctioned the profession’s role as the 
guardian of professional behaviour.13 Most fraternal societies could not, however, 
afford to increase medical fees to the level doctors demanded, and thus had to 
reconsider their health policies. As a result, many abandoned the lodge practice and 
increased sick pay. By the early 1920s, attempts to diversify health provision had been 
aborted and the medical profession was triumphant. Many ethnic fraternities and the 
communist International Worker’s Order did, however, escape this fate because they 
were able to rely on ethnic or ideological loyalty. 
The fraternal societies’ role in health insurance was also challenged by a 
proposal put forward by intellectual reformists to introduce compulsory sickness 
benefits, to include both sick pay and health care.14 The fraternal movement rejected 
state intervention on principle, as it would damage the dearly held notion of people 
helping themselves. Furthermore, state insurance was thought to be paternalistic and 
too bureaucratic. The proposed levels of provision also meant that it was highly 
unlikely that the fraternal organizations would be able to meet the minimum 
requirements and act as carriers for state insurance. Moreover, state intervention even 
threatened the very existence of the movement. The trade unions were divided,15 with 
some leaders fearing that state insurance would discourage trade union membership. 
There was also concern that the proposals would bring the state into workers’ 
households, which was seen as an infringement of individual liberty. Others thought 
that the trade unions should act for the working classes in general and not just 
organized workers; compulsory health insurance should benefit all. 
Initially, some doctors regarded state intervention as a way to get rid of the 
hated lodge practice, but ultimately the profession turned against it as well.16 Even if 
neither the commercial insurers nor employers had a vested interest in sickness 
provisions, they claimed that the very idea of state insurance was un-American by 
                                                     
13 Ibidem, 127. 
14 Ibidem, ch. 8, 143-160. 
15 B. Hoffman, The Wages of Sickness: the Politics of Health Insurance in Progressive America 
(Chaphill & London, 2001) ch. 6, 115-136.  
16 According to R.L. Numbers, the doctors organized in the American Medical Association (AMA) 
“have since 1920 consistently and effectively opposed compulsory health insurance.” Idem (ed.), 
Compulsory Health Insurance: the Continuing American Debate (Westport & London, 1982) 4. The 
AMA meeting had voted against state insurance in 1920.  
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making reference to “the autocratic, imperialistic German system”, which they feared 
was about to be introduced into US society by stealth. Even after the end of World 
War I, the German threat was replaced by a still more dangerous Bolshevist version. 
By 1920, however, all of the proposals based on the model law first published in 1915 
had failed. Some authors put the blame for this entirely on the AMA (American 
Medical Association), but Beatrice Hoffman thinks that the initiators thereof were 
equally to blame because they had neglected to sell the idea to the intended 
beneficiaries, thus failing to win their support.17 Moreover, these instigators of state 
insurance were surprised by the coalition of their opponents in 1919 and the methods 
they used to discredit the proposals. State health insurance continues to be a highly 
controversial topic in the US.  
 
2. Historical characteristics 
For a proper understanding of the typically Dutch separation of sick pay and health 
care and the strong position of doctors in the health insurance market in the 
Netherlands, we first need to understand how the relationship between doctors18 and 
health funds developed over time. By the start of the twentieth century, the Dutch 
landscape of voluntary health insurance and sickness funds was extremely diverse and 
fragmented, with considerable regional inequalities. W. Gertelmann analyzed the 
process of this separation and found that it was almost complete by 1900;19 new 
sickness funds usually only provided sick pay from the 1880s onwards. According to 
the NMG survey of health funds from 1908, only 20 percent provided both health care 
and sick pay, with these generally being those established before the 1880s and 
factory funds.20 The survey also highlights the comparatively strong position of 
doctors in the health insurance market. Indeed, since the 1840s in particular, several 
                                                     
17 Hoffman, Wages, 170. 
18 There were many different qualifications for the practising of medicine before 1865, the main 
difference being between university trained doctors (doctores medicinae) and surgeons. Unless the 
difference is important, I will use the modern term `doctor’. 
19 W. Gerdelmann, Analyse der niederländischen gesetzlichen Krankengeldversicherung unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung der Trennung van Bar- und Sachleistungen, der Entwicklung zu 
Selbstverwaltungsträgern und der Funktionsweise des Systems (Berlin, 1972) 79-100. His analysis was 
based on inquiries on sickness provisions made between 1885 and 1912.  For a summary of the results, 
Idem, 101. 
20 Rapport omtrent den toestand der ziekenfondsen in Nederland (Amsterdam, 1901/1908) Vol. 2, 23. 
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health funds had been established by doctors (and apothecaries), while they were also 
represented on the boards of other providers. Moreover, many doctors, especially 
those in the countryside, had private arrangements for their less well off patients. 
These were known as  doktersfondsen, and for a weekly subscription fee the patient 
received medical treatment from the scheme’s doctor as well as drugs.21 Accordingly, 
even if Dutch doctors had the same complaints about health insurance as their 
colleagues elsewhere, their position was actually much stronger. However, for an 
explanation of this phenomenon, we have to delve further back into the nineteenth 
century. 
Before the 1840s, the insurance of medical provision was, with a few 
exceptions, only available in the cities in Holland.22 In Rotterdam, the societies that 
were often set up by doctors did not provide sick pay, while elsewhere mutual 
societies insured sick pay, medical provision and burial costs. Moreover, some 
societies were actually profit orientated and their clients could choose which risks 
they wanted to insure. It is, however, unknown when rural surgeons introduced their 
subscription system, but by the 1840s such an approach was quite well established in 
the western provinces and Utrecht.  However, the establishment of a doktersfonds, 
which only insured medical costs, was perhaps mainly a matter of self-interest, since 
it protected the surgeons against default and prevented medical poor law applications. 
Around the same time, university trained doctors in the big cities in Holland 
began to worry about their prospects because their numbers were growing. 
Competition between doctors and surgeons likewise increased and was no longer 
limited to urban areas. As medicine had become more scientific, doctors argued that 
every such professional required science based training, a consequence of which 
should be a shrinking supply. However, despite this, it took more than 25 years before 
medical training became exclusively academic (1865) and university trained doctors 
achieved a monopoly for practising medicine. 
                                                     
21 They are comparable with English doctors or family clubs. Green, Working-class Patients, 11. 
22 L. van der Valk, “De ziekenfondskwestie rond 1840: een Amsterdams of een nationaal probleem?”,  
Gewina 26 (2003) 22-39, 28. According to the national inquiry in the 1840s, the majority of those 
insured lived in the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. The provinces of North and South 
Holland overlap the traditional territory of the province of Holland. I will use the term Holland when 
both provinces are referred to as opposed to the other provinces.  
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In the meantime, the profession had to solve its own problems. Doctors 
complained about remuneration, the need to compete for contracts, lay control and the 
admission of people to funds who could afford private fees. They were particularly 
critical of the directiefondsen, because these aimed to make a profit at the expense of 
medical personnel and patients alike. Contractual practice was regarded as threatening 
the dignity of the profession and encouraging unethical behaviour.23 Doctors in 
Amsterdam thus took the lead and asked for state intervention. When the state did not 
respond positively, however, these doctors simply founded their own health fund, the 
AZA (General Health Fund of Amsterdam). The AZA was not the first doctors’ fund 
to be established but, as the most successful, it became an example for other cities to 
follow. Indeed, in reaction to the growth of the Directiefondsen, more doctors in 
Holland than ever before entered the health insurance market. Their goal of 
standardizing training and the desire to set out rules on professional behaviour 
encouraged the establishment of professional organizations, at first locally and, since 
1849, also nationally with the formation of the NMG.  
 From the 1850s onwards, the economic tide turned and rapid urbanization 
began to take place in the 1870s, although the standard of living remained poor. 
Gradually, however, more people could either afford health insurance or were 
required to join a health fund because they no longer qualified for poor law medical 
assistance. In these circumstances, low capitation fees were caused by poverty, not by 
growing competition, as had been the case in the UK. Indeed, the opposite was the 
case, and the number of doctors  began to steadily decline after the introduction of 
medical laws in 1865, with the successful formation of health funds depending more 
than ever before on the willingness of doctors to co-operate. The mutual aid provided 
by the emerging trade organizations was usually restricted to sick pay and burial 
costs. However, since the 1880s, workers’ funds were also established in some cities 
to alleviate the disadvantages of the health funds in place in these locations. These 
workers believed that contract patients received poorer care, and the new funds, 
therefore, introduced a fee for service payment. This unfortunately proved to be too 
costly, because both professionals and members took advantage. In general, however, 
the medical profession refused to serve workers’ funds because, just as in Germany, 
they resented the consequential control exerted by the lower classes. As a result, it 
                                                     
23 Ibidem, 28, Table I. 
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was only in the big cities where there was never a shortage of doctors that these health 
funds were able to succeed. Indeed, it proved to be difficult to discourage young 
doctors in these locations from joining workers’ funds because they preferred living in 
the city and needed a practice to get them started on their career. Elsewhere, however, 
a combination of applying professional pressure and ostracising newcomers was often 
effective.  
Social provision by industrial companies, which included medical care, was 
slow to develop. However, when these new businesses did set up funds for sick pay, 
and sometimes medical provision, workers were often compelled to join. Yet the 
medical cover provided by these company funds was a poor option, since entitlement 
thereto was usually linked to sick pay, which was only given for 13 weeks.24 
Moreover, by then, the general health funds also covered a member’s family as well. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, health provision was more widespread, 
but the traditional regional pattern was still strong. In approximately 1900, members 
of health funds amounted to 27 percent of the population in the western provinces 
compared to only 0.5 percent in the southern provinces.25  Moreover, in western 
cities, club practice often outnumbered private practice. With rising standards of 
living, doctors began to ask for higher capitation fees and, depending on local 
circumstances, relations between them and the health funds became more strained. In 
some districts, doctors united to prevent the founding of new health funds and the 
medical press once again commented that such provision was a threat to do
dignity and independence. Contemporary documents one-sidedly stress so-called 
misuses of these funds and the negative effects thereof for doctors in particular. In 
reality, however, many doctors either ran their own or were represented on the board
of mutual and charitable funds. Indeed, in both speech and print, the professio
rejected the directiefondsen, even though these often provided individual doctors w
a good living. The doctors who had always feared the potential power of the health 
funds in an overcrowded medical market believed that it was degrading to serve a 
ctors’ 
s 
n 
ith 
                                                     
24 Directie van den Arbeid, Onderzoek naar de in Nederland bestaande fondsen tot ondersteuning van 
arbeiders bij ziekte (publ. nr 8, ’s-Gravenhage, 1912), 21.25 percent of company funds provided 
medical provision, covering 40 percent of the workers insured thereby.  
25 H. van der Velden, “The Dutch Health Services before Compulsory Health Insurance, 1900-1941”, 
Social history of medicine (1996) 49-68, 59. 
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workers’ health fund. Accordingly, as in Germany, they decided to adopt the methods
of their antagonists to defend class inte
 
rests.26 
                                                     
 
3. Social insurance legislation and health care 
In 1901, the first compulsory social insurance law was passed by the Dutch 
parliament in the form of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which offered both 
health provision and an allowance. Indeed, under the Act, care for injured workers 
improved considerably and more employees were able to receive medical treatment 
over a longer period of time. Although doctors had not been involved in the legislative 
process, they were nevertheless quite happy with the fees on offer, since they were 
able to treat more patients for higher sums than either a worker or his health fund 
could afford. When the Act was discussed in parliament, however, there was some 
regret that priority had not been given to sickness benefits. 
In his government statement, the new Prime Minister, Abraham Kuyper 
(1901-1905), announced an ambitious social insurance program covering invalidity 
and old age and sick pay and medical care. To get an idea of why it took so long 
before any of this coverage was introduced, it is important to be aware of the fact that 
the country was ruled by the right and the left alternately. Indeed, even after the 
relevant bills were passed in 1913, another change of government meant that the 
discussions began all over again.27  
A leading principle in Dutch social insurance legislation before 1940 was the 
notion that the insurance had to pay its own way and be governed by the same 
actuarial principles as its private counterpart. However, because the state made social 
insurance compulsory, it was consequently required to contribute towards the 
administrative costs thereof, with the only exception being old age pensions. This was 
because the state had failed to deal with the issue of provision for old age, meaning 
that it had to correct this omission and pay the deficit for any worker who was too old 
to contribute to a minimum pension. State supported health insurance was often 
26 Herold-Schmidt, “Ärztliche Interessenvertretung”, 90. L. Heijermans, “Het ontwerp ziektewet 
Treub”, De Socialistische Gids 1 (1916), 864-881, 873-4. 
27 In comparative studies on the introduction of social security, 1913 is mistakenly regarded as the start 
of compulsory sick pay and invalidity pensions. 
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discussed, but was rejected time and again for budgetary reasons.28 The right opposed 
state contributions in principle, because only (part of) the working classes were to be 
included in the compulsory system. According to the left (social liberals and 
socialists), however, social insurance was in the public interest and state contributions 
were therefore justified. Furthermore, the denominational parties regarded state 
subsidies as state assistance for the poor, which was against Dutch poor law principles 
and was thought to have a negative impact on the notion of self-help. These 
denominational parties, thus, developed the idea of `postponed’ wages, whereby 
workers had to earn enough to live on, including during periods of illness and old age; 
with this approach, the role of the state was simply to ensure that workers got what 
they were entitled to. After the introduction of universal suffrage in 1917 (with 
women being included in 1922), the denominational parties came to dominate Dutch 
political life.  
The NMG board was, however, concerned about Kuyper’s program, because it 
bound sick pay and medical care together. Accordingly, the response was immediate 
and the board met with the prime minister in January 1902.29 Despite this meeting, the 
NMG’s concerns escalated in 1903 when a newspaper reported on the proposed 
sickness scheme,30 creating the (false) impression that doctors would not be consulted 
at all. This was incorrect, but the NMG’s later confidential submissions about the 
proposals had little effect. When Kuyper presented his bill in 1904, neither the 
combination of health provision with sick pay, nor the proposed administration 
thereof had been altered as the NMG had recommended.31 Indeed, the proposals for 
health care were more ambitious than those in operation elsewhere, because wives and 
                                                     
28 Companje, D. Rigter, “Ontwerp der wet regelende de ziekteverzorging”, in Companje, 
Volksverzekering, 399-476, 460. 
29 National Archives, The Hague (hereafter, NA), Arbeidersverzekeringen, entry 2.15.08, inv. no. 600. 
The NMG letter of 30 May 1908 to the minister refers to this interview. The inventory returned by the 
NMG must have been collected in 1901 or 1902, not 1908.  
30 [C.W.A.] Van Uden, “Het ziekenfonds van niet tot iets in bestuur en wetgeving” ch. XXI, 
Ziekenfondsvragen 11 (1960) 56. The feature was published in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 17 
October 1903. It was only on the 28th that the draft was sent to the NMG. 
31 Companje, R.A.A. Vonk, “Ziektekostenverzekeringen en wettelijk geregelde arbeidsverhoudingen 
tot 1941”, in Companje, Volksverzekering, 173-476. This study analyses the legislative process in great 
detail and also pays attention to internal differences amongst doctors, a subject I have deliberately put 
to one side. 
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children and resident next of kin (e.g. the elderly) were to be covered as well. 
However, these bills were never discussed in parliament because the coalition lost its 
majority in the elections of 1905.  
The new bill in 1907 did not contain any novel elements and did not reassure 
the doctors, who believed that their status as independent professionals was under 
threat and feared that they would become as dependent on the sickness funds as their 
German colleagues were said to be. Dutch doctors were especially worried about the 
proposals to provide both sick pay and health care. They had always favoured 
separate funds for these provisions and now state intervention threatened to ignore 
these concerns. In the doctors’ view, the proposed bills were turning the clock back 
and they feared that improvements in sick pay would have a negative effect on their 
fees. The professionals were also kept in the dark because the bills said nothing about 
future fees, meaning that it was impossible to win their support with an offer of 
initially attractive amounts, as had happened under the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act. Indeed, in the UK, the level of fees on offer had proved to be instrumental in 
winning the co-operation of the medical profession there.  
In turn, the NMG had also made mistakes in its efforts to influence the 
decision-making process. In 1906 its critical comments had been submitted far too 
late to have any impact,32 and the body, therefore, decided to petition parliament.33 In 
doing so they argued that instead of improving national health, the proposals would 
actually make matters worse. Only regular workers would be entitled to benefit, and 
this was provided they were in good health. After 180 days entitlements expired even 
if medical attention was still required. Moreover, if regular workers were treated 
differently, it would become more difficult to insure both the self-employed with 
limited means and day labourers. Furthermore, the NMG stressed, the proposals 
would not end current abuses, but would also create new problems as the German 
experience had demonstrated. Moreover, by promoting private enterprise, the bill 
would encourage fragmentation and the establishment of company, denominational 
and trade union funds. The doctors, therefore, pleaded the case of regional funds and 
                                                     
32 On 12th February 1906 the minister had a meeting with the NMG board and decided on 1 April as 
the deadline for comments. Despite this, it was only in June that the NMG submitted its observations 
on the bill. 
33 Adres over het ontwerp van Wet. Ingediend bij de Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal door het 
hoofdbestuur van de NMG (Amsterdam, 1907). 
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panel practices, provided that they were also represented on the relevant boards. It is 
clear that the state’s motivation for denying doctors and apothecaries any management 
influence increased the latter’s distrust of the former. The professionals were 
supposed to be “like civil servants and therefore subordinate to the fund.”34 They, in 
turn, argued that “the State could trust the medical profession for future improvements 
in the health fund system”.35 The bill of 1907 was, however, like its predecessor, 
withdrawn after a change in government, but relations between doctors and the state 
had undoubtedly been damaged.36 
A.S. Talma, who was a minister from 1908-1913, then made the decision to 
disentangle sick pay and health insurance (in 1910). Threats to boycott compulsory 
health insurance were not Talma’s main concern; even if the number of doctors was 
increasing, the countryside still had shortages. In his view, however, the state could 
only guarantee medical treatment if there was a medical civil service.37 Such 
statements were not particularly helpful when it came to restoring good relations with 
doctors. Yet, the decision did bring about a temporary reprieve, which enabled the 
NMG to try to align conditions in the health insurance market with professional 
interests. Nevertheless, Talma’s sickness benefit bill did still set out rules for the 
future approval of health funds which did not fit in with the doctors’ ideas. 
Since lobbying had had little impact, the NMG began to develop its own 
health fund policy because internal pressure to pay more attention to the interests of 
family doctors remained high.38 The NMG’s investigation into the circumstances of 
health funds produced important results. Its report, published in 1908, laid down some 
principles for the relationship between doctors and health funds and proposed model 
rules. In 1912, the general assembly of the NMG decided on its policy towards new 
health funds, the content of which demanded separate administration for sick pay and 
                                                     
34 Adres, 62. 
35 Medisch Weekblad 20 (1913/14) 33 “dat de Staat ook de verdere ontwikkeling van het 
Ziekenfondswezen met gerustheid kan overlaten aan de geneesheeren zelf.”  
36 Relations remained strained until the early 1920s. In 1926 the NMG honoured P.J.M. Aalberse, 
because he had shown respect and improved relations between the NMG and the bureaucracy. 
Geneeskundige Gids 4 (1926) 694-695. 
37 N.E.H. van Esveld, “De zilveren ziekteverzekering”, Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid (1955) 140-149, 
142.  
38 The NMG had already decided in 1902 to favour local collective contracts in order to eliminate 
competition between doctors. 
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health provision, a free choice of doctor, equal representation of doctors on funds’ 
boards and the introduction of a wage limit for fund membership. New funds had to 
meet these requirements or face the penalty of a boycott.39 Furthermore, NMG-
members ignoring the guidelines risked expulsion and a heavy fine, if necessary to be 
enforced by way of legal action. Finally, in 1913, the last piece of the jigsaw was put 
in place with the decision to establish the Maatschappijfondsen.40 The doctors were 
able to take such a firm stand as they (and the apothecaries) had a legal monopoly on 
health services and because most of them had joined the NMG.  
Doctors felt obliged to enter the battle on this issue because their interests 
were being ignored. They had always served the health funds at fairly low capitation 
fees, but only for philanthropic reasons, and believed that it would be unfair if this 
became institutionalized in social insurance legislation. In order to safeguard its 
position in the long-term, the profession considered it to be imperative to get a 
majority on the insurance boards. Accordingly, in the ensuing discourse the negative 
effects of dependency on the boards and the importance of philanthropic behaviour 
were underlined. In reality, these actions were not altruistic and many non-medics 
thought the attitude of the doctors was arrogant. They seemed to think that health 
funds existed for their benefit and this caused much annoyance and intensified the 
controversy. The NMG focussed its `battle’ on mutual and workers’ funds, because 
the state was proposing that only not-for-profit organizations would be admitted under 
the intended system.41 The directiefondsen, which were earlier seen as a major threat, 
were therefore no longer the main enemy. 
                                                     
39 H.F. van der Velden, Financiële toegankelijkheid tot gezondheidszorg in Nederland, 1850-1940 
(Rotterdam, 1993) 59-72; 200-205; Idem, “Dutch health services”, 57-62; Companje, Over artsen en 
verzekeraars: een historische studie naar de factoren, die de relatie ziekenfondsen-artsen vanaf 1827 
op landelijk en regionaal niveau hebben beïnvloed (n.p., 1997) 117-140.  
40 A Maatschappijfonds could only be established by the majority of a branch. Without a majority the 
fund could, however, be authorized as a `special’ fund.  
In a comment on the bill H. Burger had already argued in 1905 that doctors had to establish health 
funds in order to prevent “the foundation of unwanted insurance bodies”. H. Burger, “Het ontwerp-
ziekteverzekeringswet”, NTvG (Nederlandsch Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde) 41 (1905) vol. I, 570. 
However, Burger also recommended co-operation with trade unions, employers and apothecaries to 
prevent misunderstandings about doctors’ motives. 
41 Companje, `Ziekenzorg en ziekengeld’, 271. 
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In reaction to the NMG’s policy, some mutual societies came together in the 
Federation (1913) to defend their interests and promote the notion of self-help.42 
Since the majority of doctors had joined the NMG, it was almost impossible to ignore 
its demands. Moreover, mutual funds were often quite small, and it thus proved to be 
difficult to collect the necessary means to establish new mutual funds and resist 
boycotts. Relations worsened when some of the larger mutual funds tried to become 
self-supporting by engaging salaried doctors and setting up pharmacies, moves which 
the professional organizations (NMG and NMP) fiercely opposed.  
Initially, the trade unions had kept out of the debate, because they considered 
compulsory sick pay to be more important.43 Indeed, in 1915, they rejected attempts 
by the Federation to join forces against the NMG. Likewise, many mutual funds also 
declined to work in close co-operation with the trade unions because they feared 
politicization.44 However, for a number of reasons, the attitude of the labour 
movement began to change in the early 1920s. During World War I, the trade unions 
had implemented unemployment insurance in close co-operation with employers and 
the state. Their involvement as carrier organizations of social insurance also seemed 
to have paid off in terms of a rise in membership numbers. Furthermore, the Dutch 
consultation structure began to take shape around this time, with the Minister of 
Labour, P.J.M. Aalberse, setting up the Supreme Council of Labour in 1919, which 
was an advisory body consisting of 13 representatives from each of the employers’ 
organizations, trade unions and specialists, along with  six government officials. One 
of the Council’s sub-committees dealt with the issue of social insurance policy. These 
new circumstances were particularly important when it came to ideas on the executive 
structure of the Sickness Benefit Act. The socialist union (NVV, Dutch league of 
trade unions) developed its own proposals, however, and no longer favoured the 
implementation of sickness benefits by the state. E. Kupers argued that the organizing 
power of both employers and workers had increased considerably, meaning that they 
                                                     
42 In full, the National federation for the protection of health funds. In 1937, it was reconstituted and 
continued its existence as the Central Federation for Mutual Health Funds (CBOZ).  
43 Moreover, before World War I, the `new’ socialist trade union confined itself primarily to the issue 
of labour conditions; social insurances were left to the political socialist organization, the Social 
Democratic Labour Party (SDAP).  
44 Het Ziekenfonds (1926) 4. 
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could, therefore, be put in charge.45 When it came to the executive structure of 
sickness benefits, the NVV had moved closer to the ideas of the denominational 
unions, but, unlike the Catholic union, did not favour trade union health funds. 
In 1916, the Dutch episcopacy decided that the trade unions were the obvious 
bodies to provide health insurance.46 Indeed, in the 1920s, the foundation of health 
funds became an important topic for Catholic workers.47 As Catholic doctrine did not 
accept family planning and demanded medical behaviour in line with its moral code, 
the Catholic funds could not agree to the notion of the free choice of doctors 
demanded by the NMG.48 The NMG, in turn, rejected the idea of denominational 
division on principle, and opposed the notion of health provision by labour 
organizations. Accordingly, for many years, the NMG was not prepared to enter into 
contracts with Catholic funds or their umbrella association, which was established in 
1932. Even after the relationship between the NMG and the Catholic organizations 
had improved, it continued to be impossible to normalize matters. This was because 
the branches in the south of the country refused to co-operate, 49 which even Festen, 
the author of a history of the NMG, recognized was inspired by their deeply felt 
aversion to trade union health funds.50  
The NVV, on the other hand, argued in favour of compulsory health insurance 
implemented by regional bodies, since it would be more cost effective and result in 
better health care.51 In its view, the establishment of trade union health funds was 
counterproductive. Events of the time did, however, necessitate change. Time and 
again, the medical profession displayed its profound distrust of the labour movement. 
In fact, the NMG’s goal of dominating the health insurance market brought about 
                                                     
45 E. Kupers, `De wet op de ziekenverzorging’, Sociale Voorzorg (1920) 729-782. The Socialistische 
Gids (1920) thought the move was surprising. 
46 25 Jaren bond van Roomskatholieke ziekenfondsen (n.p., n.d.[1957]) 230; 242. 
47 In 1925, the Catholic labour organizations were united in a national trade union, the RKWV.  
48 25 Jaren bond, 243-244.  
49 Idem, 247-255; J. Paulus, Vijftig jaar Centraal Ziekenfonds in het bisdom Roermond (Sittard, 1976) 
22; C.W.A. van Uden, Gezondheidszorg in eigen hand: vijfentwintig jaar geschiedenis van het 
Centraal Ziekenfonds in het Bisdom Den Bosch, 1930-1955 (’s-Hertogenbosch, 1955) 138-142. It took 
until 1940 before the agreement from 1937 resulted in the first contract. 
50 H. Festen, 125 Jaar geneeskunst en maatschappij. Geschiedenis van de Koninklijke Nederlandsche 
Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst (Utrecht, 1974) 369. 
51 Kupers, `Ziekenverzorging’, 743-4. 
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what it had feared the most, a coalition between its opponents; in 1929, the socialist 
NVV, the Christian Union (CNV) and the Federation joined forces.52 
Even if the NMG’s guidelines were only intended to apply to new health 
funds, they were nonetheless forced upon other funds as well. Doctors tried to 
convince boards/owners “that it is only in their own interest to accept our will”.53 
Agitation by doctors was even able to force funds to close down, but they were not 
always successful in doing so. Indeed, in 1915, the attempt to liquidate the Eendracht 
en Vlijt in Brielle and transfer its members to a Maatschappijfonds failed because 
some doctors refused to agree. Yet boycotts by doctors evoked much opposition and 
they were accused of failing in their duty to care for patients. Many regarded 
boycotting as another move in the attempt to monopolize health insurance. Since 
feelings were running so high, the NMG published a pamphlet to explain its 
position.54 It did not, however, abandon the notion of a boycott as a weapon which 
could force a fund to close down, with this happening in 1929 to the traditional 
sickness and burial society in Hellevoetsluis when its doctor refused to fulfil his 
contract and no replacement could be found because the NMG supported its medic.55 
The collective contract policy proved to have far-reaching consequences, and 
became an important instrument with which to impose the NMG’s conditions on the 
health funds which were not included in the 1912 decision. In reality, though, a 
collective contract brought an end to the conflict between doctors and health funds in 
many cities.56 The introduction of wage limits excluded the middle classes and, as a 
result, health insurance for this group was developed, often being set up by 
                                                     
52 Companje, Convergerende belangen: belangenbehartiging van de zorgverzekeraars in historisch 
perspectief, 1900-2001 (Zeist, 2001) 62-65. The co-operation ended in 1934 when the unions and the 
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vol. II, 733-750, 734.  
54 De ziekenfondsactie van de NMG (Haarlem, 1918). Published in response to the allegations made by 
the socialist member of parliament, J.H. Schaper, in Dokters-tyrannie: aan de Nederlandsche arbeiders 
(Amsterdam, 1914).  
55 Het Ziekenfonds 5 (1929) 2-3. 
56 De Wilde, “Rechtspositie der artsen bij de ziekenfondsen gedurende de laatste 25 jaar”, in 
Gedenkschrift bij het honderd-jarig bestaan van den Geneeskundige Kring Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 1948) 
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commercial insurers. Such businesses did not provide insurance in kind, but instead 
remitted an agreed sum of money for a doctor’s visits and drugs. After some debate, 
in 1918, the NMG decided that these funds should be free to develop because they did 
not affect the relationship between doctor and patient.57 For commercial insurers this 
market was far more appealing than the health fund market regulated by collective 
contracts. Moreover, this target group was also more likely to be open to buying other 
insurance as well. 
By 1930, the NMG’s goals had largely been achieved, even if doctors’ 
complaints about `misuse’ suggest otherwise. The Sickness Benefit Act of 1929 
referred to future health fund legislation, but was silent about its content.58 However, 
even if the Federation had rejected the idea of the free choice of doctors on principle 
and some mutual funds had employed their own doctors, the panel practice had 
become widely accepted. Capitation fees had also improved and were subjected to 
periodic negotiations. Collective contracts likewise set a kind of national standard for 
health care provision, which meant that there were some improvements. However, in 
general, rising contributions were, for the most part, absorbed by rising remuneration 
rates.59 The introduction and rigorous implementation of a wage limit caused much 
unrest. The mutual funds thought that it was unfair to expel loyal members only 
because their income had improved, and 65 of these bodies still did not have a wage 
limit in 1936. By the end of the 1920s, however, most funds did apply some kind of 
wage cap, even if differences of opinion on the level thereof could run high.60 The 
composition of the boards also continued to be an important source of conflict. The 
doctors’ views on equal representation were also rather peculiar, because apothecaries 
were regarded as being in a category of their own, which meant that members got 
only a third of the available seats on a board. The mutual funds recognized only two 
                                                     
57 The debate continued, but these companies were never boycotted. H.L. Kunneman, De 
ziektekostenverzekering (Zeist, 1951) 94-116. 
58 The Act of 1929 was so different that it can hardly be regarded as an amendment to the original 1913 
bill. Van Esveld regards the Act as Talma-law. According to Slotemaker de Bruïne, who finally 
enacted the law, the amendments to the original bill had resulted in a new law. Van Esveld, “De 
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59 Van der Velden, “Dutch Health Services”, 61-62. 
60 CBS, Overzicht, 20-24 gives an overview of wage limits. In 1936, 23 percent of the mutual funds did 
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partners, namely suppliers of services and consumers, and believed that the former 
tried to hijack the funds. The mutual funds were, however, increasingly ready to 
accept a doctor’s representative on their boards, but only in districts without a 
Maatschappijfonds.61 In the early 1930s the NMG-board once again vetoed the notion 
of equal representation by consumers and set in train another “battle of the clubs”.62 
By then the NMG was extremely strong, and in 1931 only 97 of the 2,137 health fund 
doctors were not registered as NMG members.63 The doctors were convinced that 
they were right and demanded no less than total surrender. Indeed, because the Talma 
laws were postponed and the dispute about the executive structure was reopened, the 
state had enabled the NMG to develop its health fund policy in full.64 
                                                     
  
4. The development of the Maatschappijfondsen 
The decisions made about the Maatschappijfondsen were an essential complement to 
the boycotting of the funds that refused to accept the NMG’s conditions. Only when 
they could refer patients to another (preferably a doctor’s) fund was a boycott not 
depicted as a strike. Although the general meeting of 1913 had supported the idea of 
Maatschappijfondsen, the results were initially rather disappointing. At first the plan 
seemed to have taken off. According to contemporary sources, 32 branches submitted 
proposed rules for the founding of a Maatschappijfonds in 1914 and 1915, but the 
actual foundation of the funds often either failed, or the rules did not meet the NMG’s 
requirements.65 Accordingly, by 1924, only 23 Maatschappijfondsen and 10 `special’ 
health funds had been established.66 
61 Festen, 125 Jaar, 374; Het Ziekenfonds (1932) no. 1/2, 3. 
62 Idem, 6-7.  
63 F.S. Noordhoff, “Het NVV en het ziekenfondswezen”, De Vakbeweging 13 (1933) 134. 
64 Talma couldn’t reconcile the opponents of state implementation, namely big business, in the first 
place. His own party favoured societal organization over state intervention, but was also convinced that 
compulsory insurance required sufficient control to minimise the risks for the state. He therefore 
created a system in which the interested parties – state, employers and labour – had an important role. 
65 According to the CBS, Overzicht van den omvang van het ziekenfondswezen in Nederland op 1 januari 
1936 (`s-Gravenhage, 1937) 19 were founded in 1914 and 1915. The enquiry of the Public Health 
Inspectorate from 1926 also registered too many (48). This enquiry was published in Verslagen en 
mededelingen betreffende de volksgezondheid (`s-Gravenhage, 1931) 1565-1572. NA, NMG Archief 
1849-1942, entry 2.19.053.01, inv. no. 181, 5 June 1935 W.J.M. Drooglever Fortuyn to Chr. Eggink. 
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Van Lieburg identifies the turning point for the Maatschappijfondsen as the 
mid 1920s, due to the development of health funds by trade unions.67 However, this 
observation only holds true for Catholic regions, where the doctors’ response to union 
activities was the Maatschappijfondsen. Elsewhere, the enactment of the Sickness 
Benefit Act and the 1929 agreement between the unions and the Federation were 
conclusive, with the number of Maatschappijfondsen nearly doubling between 1929 
and 1941. The Maatschappijfondsen were regional, and, compared to the mutual 
funds, fairly large organizations (Appendix, Table III). So, why did the initial 
enthusiasm fade so quickly, and why was this policy more successful in the1930s, 
when the economy was hit by recession and unemployment? 
The delay in introducing the Talma laws reduced the sense of urgency, but this 
was not the only reason. Internal differences (between family doctors and specialists, 
city and country doctors and between the NMG board and its committee for health 
funds) led to endless debates.68 Furthermore, the NMG’s collective contract policy 
resolved the most pressing problems in the cities, where during World War I 
inflationary pressures had forced the funds to readjust capitation fees.69 Moreover, as 
many of their demands were met, doctors were no longer interested in the 
Maatschappijfondsen. Indeed, in many regions there were no health funds at all. 
Numerous doctors also refused to co-operate because they preferred private 
practice.70 Indeed, in the countryside, the actual founding of an approved fund of
failed because doctors did not want to give up their private doktersfonds. Overal
doctors did seem to have been rather reluctant to unite under the NMG, instead 
preferring their independence. Indeed, in the big cities, successful health funds set up 
ten 
l, the 
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68 Festen, 125 Jaar, 240 ff, 370 ff. 
69 Van der Velden, “Dutch health services”, 60-61. 
70 M.A. Jansma, “Ontstaan en positie van den huisarts gedurende het bestaan der Maatschappij”, in 
Gedenkboek ter gelegenheid van het honderd-jarig bestaan (Amsterdam, n.d. [1949]) 212-225, 218. 
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by doctors in the nineteenth century had nothing to gain by changing their status to 
Maatschappijfonds. In this respect it is illustrative that in 1925 the Algemeen 
Ziekenfonds Rotterdam even reconsidered its position and regained its 
independence.71 Conditions were different in smaller cities, however, where recently 
founded doctors’ funds were more inclined to turn into a Maatschappijfonds. 
Elsewhere, the (imminent) foundation of a new health fund was decisive. 
In the countryside, and in the southern and north-eastern provinces in 
particular, the NMG’s goal of setting national standards for contributions, fees and a 
wage limit did not suit rural conditions.72 In reality, the urban based wage limit 
threatened private practice since, with the exception of the local elite, almost the 
entire population would become eligible. The NMG thus had to quickly recognise that 
local conditions demanded different criteria, but even this did not solve the problem. 
Doktersfondsen offered only a few services and used to be cheaper. Indeed, 
agricultural workers could not afford to make higher contributions,73 while in many 
poor districts the doctor preferred to continue with his private doktersfonds and earn 
some extra money instead of increasing the number of his poor law patients. 
For approval as a Maatschappijfonds, a fund had to meet the criteria set out by 
the NMG. The NMG did not, however, offer much in return, apart from (moral) 
support. Initially, many funds were simply a collection of doktersfondsen, and the 
medic still had to collect the contributions thereto. Although patients had to pay more 
to a Maatschappijfond, they were also insured for specialist care and, later on, dental 
work. However, apart from the transfer to the central organization of only small 
amounts for this specialist care, nothing changed. Indeed, in Alkmaar, which had the 
first Maatschappijfonds, it was only the city which earmarked some money as a 
reserve.74 Local conditions did, however, prove to be more divergent than the NMG 
had assumed, not only between regions, but also between cities and nearby villages. 
Consequently, even the early Maatschappijfondsen found it difficult to comply with 
the rules of the NMG’s model health fund. 
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There are, however, some indications that the NMG, or rather its sub-
committee on health funds, did try to improve its services.75 In the 1920s, it even 
considered entering into close co-operation with industrial life insurers, who were 
interested in collecting contributions because doing so provided plenty of 
opportunities to sell life insurance products.76 Nevertheless, the general meeting of 
1926 vetoed this plan, the content of which was in sharp contrast to traditional 
attitudes towards commercial insurers. Ultimately, the NMG, therefore, established its 
own administrative organization known as the Cavined. Moreover, for the first time, it 
also arranged meetings for both the governors and managers of its funds, with the aim 
being to create a platform for debate and develop a corporate identity.77 The funds 
were, however, suspicious of the NMG’s real motives and feared a violation of their 
autonomy. In 1928, the NMG-board turned down proposals by its sub-committee on 
health funds to unite the funds in one body. By the early 1930s, however, the local 
funds had gradually come to recognise the need for closer co-operation against the 
umbrella organizations of the Catholic and mutual funds, but the NMG-board again 
opposed any such concentration scheme.78  
In general, the founding of Maatschappijfondsen was motivated by 
competition, and prior to 1920 they were primarily established in Holland, where 
ample opportunities to take out health insurance already existed. In this region, the 
directiefondsen were expanding into the countryside, meaning that rural doctors were 
ready to participate therein. Many of the early Maatschappijfondsen originated from 
either a conflict between doctors and local health fund(s) or the introduction of a new 
health fund, particularly a workers’ version. Indeed, the provinces with comparatively 
few health funds (other than Groningen) were left behind, and by 1929 the NMG-
funds only insured 490,000 people, which was not an impressive figure.  
 
5. The battlefield in the thirties 
                                                     
75 The situation was more complicated because the NMG board and its committee had differing 
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The clause in the Sickness Benefit Act which made sick pay conditional upon health 
fund membership was postponed until rules on approved health funds were 
introduced. In anticipation of this legislation, the unions promoted - in co-operation 
with the Federation - mutual health funds. In fact, every interested party intensified 
their recruitment efforts and the umbrella organizations attempted to establish new 
branches. Once again, the NMG favoured the strict application of its conditions, of 
which the composition of the board was the most controversial. Doctors also 
harboured a deeply felt distrust of trade unions, which were suspected of having 
political motives. The NMG even presented this argument in top-level talks with the 
Department of Health. In the former’s view, political motives led to more mutual 
funds and more power for the other party to over-rule doctors. The NMG even 
referred to the example of Germany in the past.79 It is clear that ideological 
differences became more pronounced once the Federation and the trade unions joined 
forces. Furthermore, the growing number of doctors kept the pressure on,80 with the 
NMG encouraging its members, and rural doctors in particular, to establish as many 
Maatschappijfondsen as possible.81 As a consequence, between 1929 and 1934, 27 
new Maatschappijfondsen were established and membership doubled.82 As the policy 
to boycott health funds had earlier been met with great disapproval, a new tactic was 
now applied. Unless a new fund accepted the NMG’s conditions, doctors refused to 
treat patients for a capitation fee, but instead claimed full rates and sometimes charged 
for unnecessary treatments.83 As a result, new mutual and workers’ funds got into 
serious financial difficulty, causing the Federation to seek mediation by way of the 
state authorities.84 
In the meantime, the immediate future looked bleak. With rising 
unemployment, an increasing number of people could no longer afford membership of 
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a fund and had to apply for poor law medical assistance instead. These losses were, 
however, at least partially compensated for by new members, who became eligible as 
their income fell.85 Any attempt by local authorities to introduce a discount for people 
on the dole was, nevertheless, initially refused by the Minister of Social Affairs. 
However, in July 1934, he finally agreed to a special rate, with local authorities, 
medical staff and health funds having to bear the costs.86 Despite this, many local 
authorities instead preferred to provide medical relief, which cost them less. 
According to an enquiry by the CBS, only 100,000 of the more than 600,000 who 
were unemployed were covered by this emergency rule.87 However, Van der Velden’s 
assumption that “overall membership of the funds stagnated” and that growth only 
resumed with falling unemployment after 1936 is disputable.88  
Membership of the Maatschappijfondsen doubled between 1929 and 1934. 
Moreover, even if this was partly caused by takeovers, these data indicate that there 
was growth followed by only two years of stagnation.89 Indeed, in 1936, growth 
began again and membership showed a 40 percent increase between 1936 and 1941.  
In 1934, having held an enquiry into health fund membership in nine cities and 
separately registering the numbers insured with the directiefondsen, the chief medical 
officer (CMO) produced  a missive on these funds and future legislation.90 When 
compared to the CBS’s statistics of 1936, the CMO had registered three extra 
directiefondsen. As the CBS did not register funds which reimbursed medical costs to 
those insured, these three companies must have been middle-class funds. One such 
fund was the EHL Bank, which was mentioned as being one of the largest (along with 
the `Rotterdams Ziekenfonds’). In 1933, the directiefondsen insured 428,741 people, 
while in 1936 this had risen to 565,560, an increase of 32 percent. On the one hand, it 
                                                     
85 B. Widdershoven, Het dilemma van solidariteit: de Nederlandse onderlinge ziekenfondsen, 1890-
1941 (Amsterdam 205) 244; Van der Velden, “Dutch Health Services”, 66. The chief medical officer 
expected a continued growth in membership because the income of the self-employed was dropping. 
Geneeskundige Hoofdinspectie, inv. no. 254, 22 August 1934. 
86 Het Ziekenfonds (1934), no. 3. Sometimes, local government pressed the unemployed to join a health 
fund and in the case of refusal reduced benefits accordingly, e.g. Beverwijk. 
87 Maanschrift CBS 31 (1936) 1283. 
88 Van der Velden, “Dutch Health Services”, 66. 
89 See note 79. According to the CBS statistics of 1936, 13, the numbers above the age of 16 increased 
during 1935 as well. This was due to demographic conditions. 
90 NA, Geneeskundige Hoofdinspectie, inv. no. 254, 22 August 1934. 
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could be said that the increase was greater because three companies had not been 
included in the 1936 statistics, but on the other it is unknown whether the numbers in 
1933 were converted to insured individuals.91 However, in spite of these uncertainties, 
the data indicate growth rather than stagnation. Indeed, between 1936 and 1941, these 
funds increased by another 20 percent.  
Since our knowledge of company funds is poor, it is impossible to reconstruct 
how they fared during the early years of the depression. Apart from the miners and the 
railway funds, which covered 72 percent of those insured in this category in 1936, 
only 63 company funds - insuring only slightly more than 100,000 people – provided 
health care. It is possible that the collectivisation of sick pay and the need to 
economise as the depression deepened forced enterprises to close down their company 
funds, which meant that their workers had to move over to the general health funds, 
which had always provided family coverage.92 As a consequence, company funds 
probably became less important. 
The two other categories – mutual and others – seem to have been stagnant 
between 1926 and 1936, which can be explained by the fact that only the health funds 
from these categories changed into a Maatschappijfonds.93 As far as data on the 
membership of individual funds in these categories are available, it seems that their 
growth rates were rather low. The data do, however, suggest that there was some 
growth in the late 1920s, followed by stagnation or decline in the early 1930s. Indeed, 
Widdershoven’s study of the development of mutual funds suggests that they stalled 
between 1930 and 1940.94 In contrast, the national figures produced by the CBS 
registered a 22 percent increase in national membership of mutual funds between 
1936 and 1941, suggesting that local differences must have been considerable. 
It is difficult to assess the different, often contradictory, developments. Why 
growing unemployment was not followed by a drop in health fund membership is 
usually explained by the fact that more people qualified for it because of a fall in their 
                                                     
91 See Appendix 36 for details. 
92 Directie van den Arbeid, Onderzoek, 21, counted 130 company funds providing health care. In 1936, 
there were 65 company funds, only 33 of which had started before 1912, which means that about a 100 
had disappeared. 
93 For example, in 1931 in Amersfoort (1931 12,457 members), 1933 VHZ in Utrecht (1934, 55,000 
members).  
94 Widdershoven, Het dilemma, 93. 
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income. Wage reduction might also have made more people aware of the need to join 
a health fund. The emergency rule undoubtedly had some influence as well, and at the 
local level it could even make a significant difference. In Amsterdam, the number of 
health fund members covered by the emergency rule rose from eight percent in 1934 
to 15 percent in 1936,95 while in the city of Utrecht membership only decreased in 
1934, but began to rise again in 1935. It was only `Ziekenzorg’ which experienced a 
decline, and this was because it was hit by a boycott.96 Moreover, on some occasions, 
health funds and medical providers agreed special rules for the unemployed without a 
municipal subsidy and in doing so succeeded in keeping them in the health insurance 
system. In addition, the emergency rule was later introduced in more districts, and on 
1 January 1938 it covered more than 300,000 individuals, equating to nine percent of 
those insured.97 The most important motivation for joining a fund was the 
introduction of the Sickness Benefit Act, which was used by health funds to convince 
people of the need to become a member, while the same pressure also emanated from
the medical control of sick pay. Moreover, the Act led to fierce competition, increased 
recruitment efforts and, above all, readiness on the part of doctors to unite
Maatschappijfondsen. Finally, in 1931, the NMG introduced an excellent tool with 
which to press doctors to establish its funds; to end the recurring disputes on the 
foundation of new funds, the NMG initiated an agreement with the other parties to 
abandon any attempt to start a new fund in communities with a well functioning 
health fund.
 
 behind the 
                                                     
98 In a sense, this made a Maatschappijfonds a necessary condition to 
keeping the mutual funds out. At the same time, this condition frustrated the growth 
of the mutual movement. While in 1936 more than 3.4 million people were insured, 
this number had risen to nearly 4.3 million on 1 January 1941. The increase in 
membership of the Maatschappijfondsen nearly equalled the growth of the other funds 
put together, amounting to more than 1.5 million members in 1941 (Appendix, Table 
I). 
 
6. The National Health Decree (Ziekenfondsenbesluit) of 1941 
95 Ibidem, 240. Amsterdam had already introduced a special rate without the minister’s consent. 
96 Companje, Artsen, 286; 298. 
97 Maandschrift CBS 33 (1938) 885. 
98 NA, Geneeskundige Hoofdinspectie, inv. 253. Companje, Artsen, 184. 
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When the Germans occupied the Netherlands, some expected that the adoption of 
German leadership principles would lead to a resolution of some of the persistent 
problems that had proved to be impossible to resolve as long as politicians wanted 
consensus. The NMG negotiator, Chr. Eggink, tried to exploit the situation and put 
pressure on the representatives of the Federation and the Catholic funds to accept a 
blueprint to unite every health fund under a national NMG-organization. This was the 
so-called concentration scheme, and its supporters argued that it was better to take 
such a step now, voluntarily, rather than later on when forced to do so by the 
Germans. Eggink presented the scheme at a meeting arranged by the Department of 
Health and thought that the other parties had assented to his proposals. In fact, there 
was an objection to the notion of unconditional consent, although there was agreement 
that some concentration was desirable. The minutes do indeed suggest that there was 
agreement between the parties, but this document was actually conceived by Eggink 
and was never authorised.99   
The Director General (DG) of Public Health and the chairman of the meeting, 
C. van den Berg, had not been informed of the NMG’s proposal beforehand. 
However, the idea of revolutionizing health insurance by regional concentration had 
already been made public in the Geneeskundige Gids (Medical Guide).100 As acting 
DG, Van den Berg was explicitly invited to act according to the NMG’s wishes, but 
he made it perfectly clear that the Department of Health had no intention whatsoever 
of violating Dutch traditions.101 Indeed, Van den Berg intended to complete the 
project in line with previous instructions and did not expect the new regime to be 
interested in the subject. As it turned out, he was wrong, because the Germans, who 
wanted to win over Dutch workers and feared Dutch price competition, insisted on the 
introduction of compulsory health insurance. The Dutch national socialists were 
equally interested in the subject, because they expected to become more popular if 
they could claim the credit for improvements in social security. German officials, 
thus, developed a scheme of their own, but, because of internal differences, Dutch 
                                                     
99 NA, Volksgezondheid 1918-1950, inv. no. 1338, meeting of 15 August 1940. 
100 “Concentratie van ziekenfondsen. Nu en naar eigen inzicht beter dan weldra gedwongen”, 
Geneeskundige Gids 18 (1940) 636-639. 
101 NA, Volksgezondheid 1918-1950, inv. no. 1338. Speech by the Director General on 31 July 1940. 
13 August 1940, meeting with the NMG. More details in H.C. v. d. Hoeven, Ziekenfondsen en de 
Duitse bezetting: de werkelijkheid over het Ziekenfondsenbesluit (Den Haag, 1989) 18-25.  
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officials were able to influence the final Decree to some extent.102 The post-war 
government did not reverse the improvements made to social security provision and 
claimed that they were in line with Dutch developments. This was, of course, an ad 
hoc argument because, in reality, it was impossible to cancel all of the social policy 
interventions made by the Germans, particularly because the Dutch authorities in 
London, influenced by the English example, had already promised structural changes 
to social security. Van der Hoeven has established that the German influence on the 
Decree was greater than was generally acknowledged.103 In particular, the centralized, 
bureaucratic executive structure was the opposite of the autonomy that the doctors - 
and the other funds - had always pursued. Furthermore, both compulsion and taxing 
the premium on employers and workers alike was also a demand of the Germans.  
The National Health Decree of 1 July 1941 was to come into force on 1 
November, meaning that there was little time to prepare for the massive change in 
membership that was expected. Funds with fewer than 3,000 members had to go into 
liquidation, which typically affected doktersfondsen and mutual funds. To prevent 
unwanted developments, in particular an uncontrolled race to establish branches, the 
state ruled that approval depended on the circumstances on 15 October 1941.104 This 
decision was to the advantage of the doctors with their nationwide network, with the 
state allowing them to reap the benefits of the `battle of the clubs’, which had 
impeded the growth of the mutual health movement. Mutual and co-operative funds 
had, almost by definition, a limited radius of coverage, namely one city or village, and 
were therefore quite small. To overcome these limitations, the Federation had already 
established a national fund, the Anoz, in 1938, in order to prevent the forced 
liquidation of small mutual funds as a result of state rules.105 This meant that they 
could continue as branches of Anoz. Until the National Health Decree, however, the 
Anoz was nothing more than an empty shell. Only the funds of the Catholic union 
                                                     
102 According to the commissioner for health funds, the Decree was based on the original draft by the 
DG and followed the guidelines of the Department of Health. Verslag van de commissaris, belast met 
het toezicht op de ziekenfondsen, over het tijdvak 1 nov. 1941-31 dec. 1942 (1946) 16. 
103 Van der Hoeven, Duitse bezetting, 27-39. 
104 25 Jaren bond, 260. 
105 E.W. van der Hoeven, Anoz van A tot Z. Vijftig jaar landelijk ziekenfonds en zijn eigenaardigheden, 
14-16. The NMG was furious because it regarded the Anoz as a sign that the mutual funds intended to 
extend into the countryside.  
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were regional, but they had been limited by medical opposition to them. The NMG-
funds, on the other hand, were regional organizations and covered the countryside as 
well. Under the new conditions, hospital care was included and funds providing 
hospital insurance thus feared for their existence and considered applying for the 
status of an approved health fund. Since these hospital funds had a regional basis and 
covered the countryside as well, doctors were afraid that they would provide fierce 
competition and enable the mutual health movement to penetrate rural areas, which 
used to be the medics’ exclusive playing field. Moreover, the state’s bureaucracy 
pressed the Federation to reject the notion of combining with these organizations.106 
However, before another fight broke out, there were some important developments, 
meaning that traditional controversies were replaced by national loyalty, as set out 
below. 
When in occupation, the Germans wanted to incorporate every Dutch 
organization into the national socialist system, and in July 1940 the Dutch national 
socialist movement (NSB) began to take over the trade unions. Then, in December 
1941, the NSB organization for doctors - the Artsenkamer - was founded and the 
NMG was dissolved. By that time, however, many NMG members had already 
resigned and a medical resistance movement had come into existence. Nevertheless, 
the Artsenkamer claimed the Maatschappijfondsen as its own. A foundation was 
established in an attempt to protect the funds from national socialist influences, but 
this was quickly dissolved on German orders.107 When rumours spread that the NSB 
was about to take over, people started to desert the Maatschappijfondsen. Worried by 
this development, in the spring of 1942 the NSB asked the acting DG, R.A. Verwey, 
to intervene, and he decided to end the freedom to join another insurer.108 The efforts 
of the bureaucracy to maintain the status quo worked in favour of the 
Maatschappijfondsen, as their disproportional growth demonstrates (Appendix, table 
I).109 Indeed, for many years, free competition between health funds was impossible 
                                                     
106 Van der Hoeven, Duitse bezetting, 50-1. 
107 Festen, 125 Jaar, 397-398. 
108 This message was circulated on 14 April 1942. 
109 Het Ziekenfonds (1942), no. 1. In 1942, 3.4 million people were compulsorily insured as opposed to 
2 million on voluntary contracts, which was twice as high as had been expected. In general this covered 
low income civil servants and the self-employed with limited means. The effect of the introduction of a 
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and the ban, which was only lifted in 1947, was a breach of the rights of Dutch 
citizens.  
 
Conclusion 
Professional organization and the development of health insurance by commercial 
insurers and mutual societies ultimately ended in a struggle for autonomy by the 
medical profession. In general, a rapid increase in the size of the profession, coupled 
with the development of health funds, particularly workers’ funds, and/or state 
insurance schemes, produced an explosive mix. In this respect, the Dutch case was in 
line with the general pattern across the globe. 
 However, the historical development of the country had resulted in it having 
some specific characteristics. Indeed, in some regions, doctors were already closely 
involved in health funds as their proprietors by 1900. A growing shortage of 
professional medics following the introduction of the medical laws of 1865 and a 
single professional organization enabled doctors to develop co-ordinated local health 
fund policies. At the turn of the century, therefore, a separation between funds 
providing either sick pay or health care was nearly complete. Doctors claimed that 
they regarded their services as an act of charity, but their complaints about 
arbitrariness and undercutting suggest otherwise. However, with rising wages, less 
charity was needed and doctors accordingly sought better fees. At the same time, 
more doctors were graduating and competition for club practices increased. Tensions 
were building in some regions, while elsewhere there was still very little opportunity 
to insure oneself for medical help. Pressure increased when the government 
announced the introduction of compulsory social insurance, but when this did occur 
Dutch doctors were in a far stronger position in the health insurance market than their 
British colleagues. Since contract practices had been a fact of life for over a century in 
some urban regions, doctors could not reject the very notion of collectivization as 
their counterparts had in the US. However, the Dutch medics did reveal the same 
stubbornness as their American colleagues in defending a once determined position, 
and both succeeded in keeping their ranks closed. 
                                                                                                                                                        
national income limit is unknown, but must have been higher with the NMG funds, which usually 
applied a lower limit. 
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 Dutch doctors were very anxious about the intentions of the state and feared a 
subordinated position and low capitation fees, or, in their own words, a downgrading 
to `wage slavery’; compulsory insurance might bring about improved national health 
standards, but not at their expense. However, the state had little sympathy for the 
doctors’ anxieties since improving class relations by introducing social insurance was 
its main concern. State officials thus ignored doctors’ demands and, time and again, 
offended medical self-esteem by ignoring the medics’ ‘rights’ as independent 
professionals. 
By deciding that health provision would not be an integral part of social 
insurance laws, the state actually recognised the position of the NMG that health 
insurance had to be part of a national health policy instead of a social policy, as 
originally intended. This change delayed legislation and allowed the NMG to develop 
its own health fund model. As the directiefondsen were not expected to qualify as 
carrier organizations, the profession set its sights on mutual (and workers’) health 
funds. The decision to found the Maatschappijfondsen was innovative, and it proved 
to be an important weapon in the struggle for dominance. However, as long as the war 
and its aftermath delayed the introduction of sick pay, doctors had little interest in 
founding a Maatschappijfonds, and their `idealistic aim’ of improving health care and 
public health seemed to have been forgotten. The NMG’s policy was criticized time 
and again in parliament and the press, but the state let it pass. Indeed, until the 1930s, 
state officials took the legal line that conflicts between funds and doctors were the 
province of civil law. What is more, the state was still planning health care legislation 
and seemed to ignore the fact that the NMG, as a private body, was trying to turn its 
monopoly on medical treatment into regulatory powers in the health market which 
was, essentially, in the public domain. 
Even when united in a national Federation, the mutual funds’ movement was 
far too weak to be effective and possessed neither the financial means nor the mass 
base necessary to launch a counterattack. Most doctors were NMG- members and the 
mutual funds could not afford to lose their services. Moreover, the funds’ ‘natural 
ally’, the labour movement, was still in its infancy and had other priorities. The NMG, 
meanwhile, overreacted to the establishment of the Federation and many Federation 
members were hit by boycotts. 
Conflicts with mutual and workers’ funds in particular were inherent in the 
basic assumptions of the NMG’s health fund policy. Coupled with the profession’s 
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class consciousness, they were also unsolvable. Since the doctors demanded means 
tested membership, the board of a mutual fund which met this condition was 
disqualified as an acceptable employer. Gradually, the trade unions grew stronger and 
widened their objectives, not only demanding improvements in social provision, but 
participation in their implementation as well. In time, health funds also came to be 
regarded as a standard trade union concern, and when the unions had achieved their 
goal of the introduction of compulsory sick pay, they next focussed their attention on 
health insurance and joined forces with the Federation. This was precisely what the 
doctors had wanted to prevent. Moreover, the Sickness Benefit Act made the state 
regulation of health funds inevitable. Once again the NMG pressed its members to 
unite behind the Maatschappijfondsen and prevent the establishment of workers’ 
funds. It was only under these circumstances that doctors fulfilled their promise to 
improve national health care by promoting insurance. 
The uncompromising attitude towards mutual and workers’ funds, and the firm 
resistance to the equal representation of consumers, was also dictated by internal 
motives since many doctors had not yet become firm believers in the 
Maatschappijfondsen. In this respect, 1929 marked a turning point. Differences on 
matters of principle continued to be an important factor in delaying health fund 
legislation. In the end, the failure of the state to cut the ties holding changes back was 
the worst solution for every health fund. The German demand to put an end to 
differentials in labour costs resulted in compulsory health insurance for those entitled 
to sick pay. It also provided the means to cover hospital care as well, because the 
employer had to contribute. Yet, even though the health funds now had greater 
financial resources and became carrier organizations, they still had to taste defeat. 
Unlike the intentions of the Dutch state, which had only wanted to introduce approval 
procedures, the National Health Decree established a centralized, bureaucratic system 
which left the health funds with little freedom in terms of policy. Moreover, the 
Decree put an end to the position of power of the doctors and also determined entry 
conditions. This violated Dutch traditions in many respects and did not fit well with 
traditional NMG demands.  
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 Verslag van den Hoofdinspecteur van de Volksgezondheid over het jaar 1931, 
1565-1572.  
 CBS, Overzicht van den omvang van het ziekenfondswezen in Nederland op 1 
januari 1936 (`s-Gravenhage, 1937).  
 “Overzicht van het aantal bij ziekenfondsen aangesloten personen”, 
Maandschrift CBS (1937) I, 861-862.  
 Ibidem (1941) I, 70. 
 Ibidem (1942) 635-636. 
 Verslag van den commissaris belast met het toezicht op de ziekenfondsen, over 
het tijdvak 1 nov. 1941-31 dec. 1942. Offprint from Verslagen en mededeelingen 
betreffende de volksgezondheid (oct. 1946).  
 
 
Comment 
In 1926, the Medical Inspectorate (MI) held an inquiry. Then, from 1936 onwards, the 
CBS began to collect annual data on health funds. According to the CBS, its 
categorisation differed from that of the MI, and it applied the category `others’ to 
funds founded by doctors and apothecaries. Indeed, in 1926, the Nutsfondsen (the 
funds of the `Society for the Common Good (Maatschappij tot Nut van’t Algemeen) 
were included in the category `others’, while in 1936 they were registered as mutual. 
Moreover, mutual factory funds were included in `mutual funds’ in 1926, while in 
1936 they were included in `factory funds’. Accordingly, the different categories in 
1926, which are not comparable with the 1936 statistics, are put between brackets. 
However, taken together, the categories `mutual’ and `others’ indicate how they 
developed. With the exception of the province of South Holland, the original data 
from the 1926 inquiry did not survive and we cannot, therefore, adjust the numbers. 
Furthermore, it is also clear that many directiefondsen did not co-operate in 1926. The 
NMG, on the other hand, reported too many Maatschappijfondsen.  
In 1927, the MI conducted a special inquiry into doktersfondsen in the 
provinces of South Holland and Zeeland and counted 171 thereof in the former and 27 
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in the latter (NA, Geneeskundige Hoofdinspectie 1902-1952, entry 2.15.38, inv. no. 
254). Therefore, doktersfondsen were underestimated as well, not only in 1926, but 
probably also in 1936. In this latter year, however, South Holland still registered the 
highest number thereof. Moreover, in the NMG report of 1908, this province was 
again supreme with 108 of a total of 230funds. North Holland had 47, which had 
reduced to 10 in 1936 as a result of the foundation of the Maatschappijfondsen.  
The CBS report of 1936 had already noted the existence of another 49 
doktersfondsen, insuring 36,170 individuals (CBS, Overzicht, 12, note 1). In 1937, the 
CBS registered 636 funds (with 12 refusing to give any information; save for one, all 
were  doktersfondsen) compared with 547 in 1936. Because more data had been 
acquired in 1936, the number of people insured was adjusted (+76,072). The majority 
(56,365) were members of a doktersfonds. Deviation in the other categories was 
negligible. Table 1 contains the revised data for 1936 and Table III is based on these 
new data. Because the original data on doctors’ practices were so poor, and because 
they are small scale organizations in their own right, they are not included in the table 
of average membership. 
As some funds refused to cooperate, the CBS made estimates of the 
membership thereof as far as was possible. Several other funds meanwhile only 
registered the head of the household or a husband and wife, but not the children under 
the age of 14 or 16 who, at that age, had to pay an individual premium. Therefore, the 
MI and the CBS had to convert family data into insured individuals, but it is unknown 
how many individuals a family was supposed to represent. The only surviving list for 
1926 for South Holland (NA, entry 2.15.33, Gezondheidsraad, inv. 609) does not 
provide any clues about how the estimates were made, because different numbers of 
singles result in different multipliers for membership. The inquiry into doctors’ 
practices from 1927 counted a family as four individuals. The 1926 enquiry probably 
did the same. 
 
Tables 
Table I 
Number of insured (x1.000) according to type of insurer 
1926, 1936, 1941 and 1942 
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Year Maatschappij-
fondsen 
Dokters-
fondsen 
Mutual 
funds 
Commercial 
insurance 
Others Company 
funds 
Total 
1926  347 229 (849) 223 (384) (298)¹  2,331¹ 
1936 1,096 146 931 595 290 365 3,414 
1941² 1,531 148 1,138 718 373 364 4,273 
1942³ 2,528 - 1,407 851 536 126  5,735 
¹ Including 147,044 insured with the health fund of the railway company, registered separately in 1926. 
² 1941: 1st January before the introduction of compulsion.    
³ 1942: 31st December, the numbers include those compulsorily and voluntarily insured. The health 
funds of the railway company, the miners and the police, established in 1942 (together 286,688 
individuals) are included in the total. Verslag van de commissaris belast met het toezicht op de 
ziekenfondsen over het jaar 1943 (n. p., 1948) 106. 
 
Table II 
Number of health funds according to type of insurer 
1926, 1936, 1941 and 1942 
Year Maatschappij Dokters Mutual Commercial Others Company Total 
1926 48 247 (148) 29 (39) (64) 574 
1936¹ 81 133 205 50 17 65 551 
1941 89 225 201 49 17 60 650 
1942 73  63 51 11 36 234² 
¹ In 1937, 214 doctors’, 216 mutual, 22 other and 62 company funds were registered. Most of them 
already existed in 1936. 
² The process of admitting health funds as carrier organizations under the Decree had not yet been 
completed.  
  
Table III 
Average number of insured people per insurer 
1926, 1936, 1941 and 1942 
Year Maatschappij Commercial Mutual Others Company 
1926 7,229 7,705 5,737 9,851 2,390 
1936 13,532 11,899 4,539 17,053 5,615 
 1941 17,205 14,654 5,663 21,936 6,073 
  1942¹ 34,627 16,693 22,332 48,755 3,504 
¹ The health funds of the railway company, the miners and the police are not included. 
